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COMMENTARIES
TREATING TAX ISSUES THROUGH TRADE
REGIMES
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Paul R. McDaniel has performed an extremely
valuable service in clarifying the relationship between trade
and tax law. In particular, he has done so by pointing out that,
to a large extent, the two spheres do not overlap, much less
clash in their objectives. This makes sense because, fundamentally, the goal of trade law is to facilitate trade, while the goal
of tax law is to raise revenue. Thus, for example, an ideal tariff
under trade law is set at zero, but an ideal tax under tax law
is set at some positive rate. It therefore should not be surprising that there is a large measure of non-overlap between trade
and tax law.
This comment will focus on those areas in which tax and
trade law do overlap, and explore some of the ways in which
this overlap occurs. Professor McDaniel argues that the only
areas in which tax and trade law do overlap are in the case of
"tax expenditures," i.e., subsidies delivered through the tax
law. As we shall see, an examination of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) suggests that this is in-

* The author is a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School. In addition to his extensive teaching experience, Professor Avi-Yonah has
practiced law at prominent firms in New York and Boston. He has written extensively on national and international tax issues and currently focuses his research
on the interaction of globalization, tax competition, and the welfare state. His
most recent article, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, was published in the Harvard Law Review. Professor Avi-Yonah has
been a member of the U.S. Income Advisory Board for Tax Management since
1995 and has served as co-chair of several committees of the New York State Bar
Association Tax Section. He is a graduate of Hebrew University and Harvard Law
School.
1. The 1994 version of the GATT is part of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, reached at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRU-
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deed the case, but there also may be some tax-related violations of GATT that are not included in any tax expenditure
budget.
This comment is divided into three parts. First, I will
summarize the main provisions of trade law that bear on taxation. Second, I will examine the application of trade law to
three specific types of tax regimes, identified in my previous
work as "production tax havens," "traditional tax havens," and
"headquarters tax havens."2 Finally, I will discuss the general
question of whether problems in the tax law, and in particular
harmful tax competition, should be addressed through trade
law and the World Trade Organization (WTO), or are better
left to organizations with less adjudicatory power such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
II. THE GATT AND TAxEs

There are two articles of the GATT that bear directly on
taxation. Article III of the GATT provides that "internal taxes ... should not be applied to imported or domestic products

so as to afford protection to domestic production."' Because of
the reference to products, this provision generally has been
understood as referring only to indirect taxes (i.e., excise taxes
or consumption taxes such as the value added tax (VAT)).
However, even if the article is interpreted as referring to direct
taxes as well, it seems unlikely that the income tax in particular can be used as an instrument for protecting domestic
production because of the difficulty of designing income tax
provisions that will apply only to foreign production.4

MENTS,-RESULTS

OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)

[hereinafter
GATT
1994],
auailable at
http://www.wto.org/english/
docse/legal-e/final-e.htm.
2. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
3. Id. at art. III.
4. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International
Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131 (2001). Warren has argued that there is significant
scope for income tax discrimination against foreign investors which is not the
same as discrimination against foreign products or producers. But he is hard
pressed to adduce any real life examples of significant discrimination against foreign investors via the tax law. For example, the denial of imputation credits to
foreign shareholders, which is his prime example of such discrimination, is only
discriminatory if the combined corporate and withholding tax rate in the source
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Article XVI of the GATT provides in general for notification procedures in the case of any "subsidy... which operates
directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from,
or to reduce imports of any product into, [a contracting party's]
territory."5 In addition, the article expressly prohibits the use
of any subsidy "on the export of any product.., which subsidy
results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower
than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market."6 A note clarifies that the exemption of an exported product from taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption (such as zero
rating exports for VAT) "shall not be deemed to be a subsidy."7
Article XVI was expanded significantly by the Subsidies
Code included in the 1994 version of the GATT. The Subsidies Code defines "subsidy" as including cases where "government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected."9 To be actionable under the GATT, a subsidy must be
"specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or
industries."" In addition, a specific subsidy is prohibited only
if it is "contingent, in law or in fact,.., upon export performance" or "upon the use of domestic over imported goods.""
Annex I to the Subsidies Code includes an "illustrative list of
export subsidies" which includes "[t]he full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports of
direct taxes... paid or payable by industrial or commercial
enterprises." 2 However, a footnote clarifies that this language
country exceed the individual tax rate on domestic shareholders, which is unlikely
in OECD members. Even if it exists, such discrimination is not covered by the
current GATT, which does not directly address investment issues. See generally
Joel Slemrod, Free Trade Taxation and ProtectionistTaxation, 2 IN'L TAX & PUB.
FIN. 471 (1995) (while theoretically it is possible to design tax rules that have the
same effect as tariffs, in practice that this is difficult to achieve).
5. GATT 1994, at art. XVI.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS

OF THE URUGUAY ROUND

vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 229 (1994) [hereinafter Subsidies and Countervailing Measures],
available at http:/www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/final-e.htm. This agreement
only applies to products; services are covered by the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), which does not yet address subsidies.
9. Id. at art. 1.
10. Id. at art. 2.
11. Id. at art. 3.
12. Id. at Annex I. The list also includes a provision for exemption or remis-
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"is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures to
avoid the double taxation of foreign source income earned by
its enterprises.""
The other agreement included in the 1994 version of the
GATT that bears on taxation is the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS). 4 Because services frequently involve foreign direct investment (FDI), in this case the line
between trade and investment is particularly blurred. Therefore, the United States inserted provisions in the GATS that
prevent it from overriding domestic tax legislation and income
tax treaties applicable to FDI. In particular, the provision of
national treatment for service providers can be avoided if "the
difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the equitable and
effective imposition or collection of direct taxes." 5 In addition,
most favored nation (MFN) treatment can be avoided if the
difference in treatment follows from a tax treaty. 6
Ill. APPLICATION OF GATT RULES TO TAX HAVENS.
In a previous work, I have identified three types of tax
havens: (1) "production tax havens," in which there is a specific
tax holiday or other type of tax benefit designed to attract
foreign investors to set up production facilities in a host country; (2) "Traditional tax havens," i.e., jurisdictions with little or
no income tax that seek to attract foreign investors and financial service providers through the promise of no taxation and
bank secrecy; and, (3) "headquarters tax havens," i.e., regimes
designed to attract multinational enterprises (MNE) to locate
their headquarters in a jurisdiction by promising no taxation
(or no current taxation) of income derived from foreign subsidiaries.'
sion of indirect taxes in excess of those levied on products for domestic consumption, and defines direct and indirect taxes to include income tax and VAT, respectively. See id. at n.58. Deferral is allowed if accompanied by an interest charge.
Id.
13. Id. at n.59.
14. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex lB, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994),

33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/
docs_e/legal_efinal_e.htm.
15. Id. at art. XIV.
16. See id. See also id. at art. XXIII (no arbitration in the case of existing tax
treaties).
17. For further elaboration, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 2.
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How do the GATT rules previously described apply to
these three types of tax haven? The clearest application is in
the case of production tax havens. These regimes are invariably "ring fenced," i.e., they are designed to foster exports and,
therefore, are separated from the domestic economy (and sometimes also not available to domestic investors). The regimes
are ring fenced precisely because they are set up by countries
with a real domestic tax base that do not wish to see that base
eroded by the tax concessions granted within the preferential
regimes. The European Union (EU) and OECD reports on
harmful tax competition cite dozens of such regimes, even
though they limit themselves only to regimes of member countries and (in the case of the OECD) exclude "real" investments
(i.e., manufacturing). 8
There seems to be little doubt that such production tax
havens constitute prohibited export subsidies under the GATT.
They invariably involve foregone revenue (i.e., tax expenditures
in McDaniel's sense), are specific to certain taxpayers (in fact
they are frequently negotiated deals), and are, in fact, contingent on export performance because the products they involve
cannot be targeted at the domestic market.
The case of traditional tax havens is harder. Since there is
no income tax, they do not involve "foregone revenue" or a tax
expenditure in the traditional sense. However, traditional tax
havens frequently grant exemptions to the offshore sector from
those taxes they do collect (e.g., VAT). Moreover, they frequently involve not just pure investments (which are presumably not
covered by the current GATT), but in particular the provision
of intangibles (such as the know how built into financial services), targeted entirely at foreigners (and frequently ring fenced
as well). Thus, arguably traditional tax havens, or at least that
part of their activities that are more than pure passive investment, fall within the prohibition on export subsidies as well.
Moreover, since they generally are not party to tax treaties,
the exclusion of treaty matters from GATS does not cover
them.
The toughest cases are headquarters tax havens. This

18. See OECD Announces Release of Harmful Tax Competition Report, 2000
WTD 124-10 (June 26, 2000); Primarolo Group's EU Harmful Tax Competition Report Identifies 66 Violative Regimes, 2000 WTD 50-1 (March 10, 2000).
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covers specific regimes designed to attract foreign MNEs,
which are akin to production tax havens. Those presumably
are export subsidies for the reasons above stated. However,
they also cover things like the U.S. deferral regime and the
European exemption for foreign source income of domestic
MNEs. Are these export subsidies under the GATT? If the only
activity involved is pure investment (e.g., the acquisition of a
foreign target), then the regime is not covered. However, usually there also is the transfer of intangibles, and, frequently, the
sale of goods to the foreign subsidiaries. In these cases there is
trade in goods, and the provision could be an export subsidy.
The ultimate question is thus the one identified by Professor McDaniel: Is deferral or exemption a tax expenditure? In a
worldwide regime such as the U.S., the answer is clearly yes
(and deferral is in the tax expenditure budget).1 9 What about
an exemption regime? Professor McDaniel argues that the
exemption of foreign source income in Europe is part of the
normative baseline. But defining the baseline for the European
regimes is hard, since they contain many worldwide features
(such as controlled foreign corporation (CFC) regimes). Thus, I
think that it is possible to argue that there is "foregone revenue" here as well, even if it is not reflected in the tax expenditure budget.
But what about the footnote that specifically excludes
regimes designed to avoid double taxation? While the intent of
this footnote was to exclude the European regimes, query
whether an exemption regime that does not take into account
whether the income was subject to tax at the source qualifies
as a "measure to avoid double taxation." Fundamentally, a
general exemption regime distinguishes between domestic and
foreign source activities in a way that frequently subsidizes
exports, not just investments, and therefore can be construed
as an export subsidy if the income is not taxed at source.20

19. Note, however, that to the extent the transfer of tangible or intangible
goods to foreign subsidiaries is covered by sections 367 or 482, there is no subsidy
involved, since pure investment activity is not a subsidy.
20. Note, however, that the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) report (cited by
Professor McDaniel) does seem to approve of "territorial tax systems." But this is
dicta: If the case ever came before the WTO again, as seems likely, the U.S.
seems to have a stronger argument for complaining about the European exemption
systems than most tax experts assume.
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IV. SHOULD HARMFUL

TAX COMPETITION

BE ADDRESSED

THROUGH THE WTO?

Many of the contributors to this symposium have pointed
out that the problem of harmful tax competition cannot be
adequately addressed by the current international tax regime
based on bilateral treaties. 2' A multilateral effort clearly is
needed, and the question is whether the proper forum for it is
the WTO or an organization such as the OECD, with a more
restricted membership and fewer adjudicatory powers.
Reliance upon the OECD to restrict tax competition suffers
from three significant drawbacks. First, the OECD only has 29
members, and it is unclear whether it effectively can enforce
its anti-tax competition rules on non-member countries." For
example, solutions that rely on where the parents of MNEs are
located assume that no significant growth in MNEs will take
place outside of the OECD, and solutions that rely on the
OECD as the market assume no significant markets outside
the OECD. Either assumption may become wrong. When that
happens, solutions that rely on OECD enforcement will lose
their effectiveness unless those emerging markets were to join
the OECD. While several developing countries have recently
joined the OECD (e.g., South Korea and Mexico), it is hard to
imagine China or India doing so in the near future.
Second, relying on the OECD to implement solutions to
the tax competition problem, even if those solutions are tailored to benefit developing countries, may not be acceptable to
those countries. Even though the OECD has made a huge
effort to include non-OECD members in the tax competition
project, it is still identified as the rich countries' club. Thus, it
is hard to believe that developing countries will be able to shed
their suspicions that the OECD will not act in their interests
even if it actually can be made to do so. In fact, the effort by
21. See Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of
Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1261 (2001); Jack M. Mintz, National Tax
Policy and Global Competition, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1285 (2001); Peggy B.
Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26
BROOK. J. INTL L. 1335 (2001); Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation
and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1641 (2001). See also Avi-Yonah,
supra note 2.
22. The EU effort is even more limited in scope, and has run into significant
problems for this reason, as the recent developments on taxation of savings show
(the UK and Luxembourg will cooperate only if the U.S. and Switzerland do).
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the OECD to develop a multilateral agreement on investments
(MAI) foundered precisely because developing countries and
left-leaning non-governmental organizations coordinated a
campaign against it as representing the interests of the rich
countries and "their" MNEs.
Third, the OECD effort has thus far been limited to geographically mobile financial services, and excludes real investments, although these constitute a significant part of the problem. In addition, even for the areas it does cover, the OECD
only has the power to persuade, not to adjudicate.
From these perspectives, the WTO is a more attractive
candidate for "world tax organization." It has a much broader
membership than the OECD, and developing countries are
much better represented (and have real clout, as shown by the
recent struggle over choosing the Director General of WTO).
Moreover, as indicated above, the WTO rules already cover and
prohibit many forms of harmful tax competition identified by
the OECD.
But there are several serious objections to including tax
matters in the jurisdiction of the WTO. First, it has been argued that the WTO lacks sufficient tax expertise." However,
that problem can be remedied by hiring a sufficient number of
tax experts to sit on the WTO's panels. In fact, as the WTO
has, expanded its jurisdiction to non-tariff matters, its staff
already includes tax experts who also understand trade issues.
Robert Green has advanced a more serious objection arguing that the costs of imposing the WTO's legalistic disputeresolution mechanism outweigh any benefits.' Green argues
that the need for the WTO to resolve trade disputes legalistically is based on two features that are typically lacking in the
tax context: retaliation and lack of transparency. Retaliation is
a feature of repeated prisoners' dilemma type games and insures that players have an incentive to cooperate.2 5 In an assurance (stag hunt) game, both players cooperate if they can be

23. See Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1988); William M. Considine, The
DISC Legislation: An Evaluation, 7 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POL. 217 (1974).
24. See Robert M. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A Comparison of the InternationalTax and Trade Regimes, 23
YALE J. INT'L L. 79 (1995).
25. See id. See also ROBERT AxELROD,

THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

(1984).
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assured of the other player's cooperation.2 6 In the first case,
an organizational setting is needed to manage retaliatory
strategies while in the second it is needed to provide the information needed for the assurance to exist.
However, in the context of tax competition, it would seem
that both retaliation and lack of information are serious problems. For example, in the case of portfolio investment, the U.S.
began a race to the bottom by abolishing its withholding tax
and other countries responded (i.e., retaliated) by abolishing
their own taxes. In the current situation, no country dare reimpose its tax without adequate assurance that other countries
will follow. Similarly, for direct investment, countries have
adopted tax incentives or adopted deferral and exemption rules
for their resident MNEs, in response to the actions of other
countries, and fear changing such policies without assurance
that others will follow suit. Thus, whether these developments
are characterized as prisoners' dilemma or assurance games,
they seem to present precisely the kind of problem that only a
multilateral organization with rule-making power can resolve
effectively."
However, Green also raises another objection to giving the
WTO authority over taxes which in practice is likely to be far
more potent: The problem of sovereignty. Countries are wary of
giving up their sovereignty over tax matters, a fact which lies
at the heart of their ability to exercise national power. This
concern is particularly acute in the U.S. and almost led to the
failure of the entire Uruguay Round as the U.S. insisted upon,
at the last minute, excluding direct taxes from the purview of
the GATS.2" Green argues that if the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism were given authority over tax issues it may lead to
widespread non-compliance; especially given the perception
WTO is non-transparent and lacks democratic legitithat the
29
macy.
26. The assurance game has a payoff structure in which the best outcome is
if both countries cooperate while in the prisoner's dilemma the best outcome is if
you defect and the other side cooperates. See Green, supra note 24.
27. The race to the bottom in international taxation in the 1980s resembled a
prisoners' dilemma, in which one country (the U.S.) preferred to defect while others cooperated in order to draw investment to it. But the current situation is
more like an assurance game, in which the U.S. and other OECD members would
prefer cooperation above all other outcomes.
28. See Green, supra note 24.
29. See id. See also Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolu-
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Green may be wrong about this estimate, especially since
the analysis above has shown that the WTO already has jurisdiction on many forms of harmful tax competition, so that no
further extension of its powers is necessary. But even if Green
is right, and sovereignty poses a real problem, there may be a
solution to this as well. Under the GATT regime, all decisions
had to be reached by consensus, i.e., with the agreement of the
party whose regime is at stake. Under the WTO rules, on the
other hand, all dispute settlement rulings are binding unless
there is a consensus not to implement them, i.e., when even
the complaining party agrees to refrain from action. Perhaps
the former rule is more appropriate for tax matters than the
latter because it gives the loser a veto if it feels that its sovereignty is truly at stake. Similar rules exist for tax matters in
both the EU and the OECD. But, as the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) case in the GATT and the adoption of the tax competition report by the OECD show, a country typically will reserve its veto power only to those cases in
which the adverse result truly is perceived as a severe limit on
its sovereignty. In other cases, the stigma of disapproval is
sufficient to ensure cooperation.
Professor McDaniel is right in pointing out that there
exists a very significant degree of non-overlap between tax and
trade law. However, he also correctly points out that there also
exists some area of overlap, which can be defined as tax expenditures. The question is how important is this area of overlap.
I would argue that it is extremely important, and that in the
international arena the expenditures threaten to undermine
countries' ability to collect income taxes on cross-border income."0 If that is the case, then perhaps the WTO is the most
promising forum for finding a solution.

tion, 40 HARV. INTL L.J. 333 (1999) (describing factors to be weighed in choosing
between rules and standards in the WTO context). But it should be noted that the
WTO already has exercised jurisdiction over matters such as food safety, intellectual property, and similar issues that also involve sensitive sovereignty issues.
30. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 2.
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